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The Promise of a Managerial Values Approach
to Corporate Philanthropy
Jaepil Choi
Heli Wang
ABSTRACT. This article presents an alternative
rationale for corporate philanthropy based on managerial
values of benevolence and integrity. On the one hand,
top managers with benevolence and integrity values are
more likely to spread their intrinsic concern for others
into the wider society in the form of corporate philan-
thropy. On the other hand, top managers high in
benevolence and integrity are likely to contribute to
improved managerial credibility and trusting firm-stake-
holder relationships, thereby improving corporate finan-
cial performance. Therefore, the article makes the
argument that both corporate philanthropy and corporate
financial performance can better be interpreted as result-
ing from managers’ benevolence and integrity values.
KEY WORDS: corporate financial performance, corpo-
rate philanthropy, managerial values, stakeholders
Business corporations continually encounter pressure
from groups of social and community activists to
participate in philanthropic causes (Margolis and
Walsh, 2003; Smith, 1994). Some firms have re-
sponded to these heightened pressures by devoting
substantial resources to promote social welfare. For
example, approximately $12 billion in cash as well as
in-kind donations were made by business corpora-
tions during 2004, up 7.3% from the $11.18 billion
recorded for 2003 (Giving USA, 2005). Many others
firms, however, decide not to become involved in
philanthropic causes at all.
The divergence in corporations’ responses to the
call of philanthropic causes has stimulated some de-
bate regarding why public corporations engage in
corporate philanthropy and how corporate philan-
thropy relates to corporate financial performance.
Some opponents of corporate philanthropy hold an
agency perspective. This perspective is based on the
classical argument made by Friedman (1970), who
suggested that corporate philanthropy is the result of
top managers’ desires to fulfill their own needs at the
expense of shareholders. According to this view,
there are few economic benefits to be gained from
corporate philanthropy, but numerous costs associ-
ated with it. Furthermore, the costs of philanthropic
causes should be borne by charitable not-for-profit
organizations or individuals instead of by public
firms because valuable corporate resources should be
used to improve the firms’ operational efficiency.
The reason for some firms engaging in corporate
philanthropy, therefore, is that philanthropy can
benefit top managers themselves by, for example,
enhancing their reputations within their social circles
or furthering their political and career agendas
(Friedman, 1970; Galaskiewicz, 1997; Werbel and
Carter, 2002). Sometimes top managers may even
engage in philanthropic activities purely because of
their other-regarding values (Buchholtz et al., 1999;
Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977) without deriving any
political or career benefits. But to the extent that
corporate philanthropy diverts valuable corporate
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resources that could be spent on increasing organi-
zational efficiency, it still represents a form of agency
costs that reduce the firm’s value and shareholder
wealth (Helland and Smith, 2003). Therefore, the
agency argument suggests that corporate philan-
thropy may reduce an organization’s financial
performance (Figure 1).
The agency perspective’s main arguments regard-
ing corporate philanthropy, however, have been
challenged by some recent studies that hold a perfor-
mance-enhancing view of corporate philanthropy
(e.g., Drucker, 1984; Porter and Kramer, 2002;
Reder, 1995). In contrast to the agency argument,
these studies suggest that managers’ decision to engage
in corporate philanthropic activities can indeed im-
prove firm financial performance and shareholder
wealth. The financial benefits to a firm may arise, for
example, from the goodwill, the positive image and
the improved reputation that are created by corporate
involvement with philanthropic causes (Haley, 1991).
Positive social image and reputation lead to enhanced
morale among employees and greater loyalty among
suppliers and customers; and they may also influence
regulators and government officials in ways that ben-
efit corporations financially (Figure 2). Furthermore,
despite differences in sampling, methods and mea-
surement (Margolis and Walsh, 2003), many studies
have found support for a positive relationship between
corporate social performance1 and corporate financial
performance (Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Orlitzky et
al., 2003; Roman et al., 1999), a result that seems to be
consistent with the argument that corporate philan-
thropy improves firm financial performance.
Although the key argument for the positive effect
of corporate philanthropy on corporate financial
performance has gained increasing acceptance and
received largely consistent empirical support, several
key issues remain to be resolved. First, the current state
of the research still lacks integrative and systematic
frameworks that illustrate the underlying mechanisms
and contingencies through which corporate philan-
thropy is associated with corporate financial perfor-
mance2 (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Rowley and Berman,
2000; Ullmann, 1985; Wood and Jones, 1995). As a
result, the literature still falls short in guiding future
research and helping practitioners to make appropriate
corporate policies regarding philanthropic activities.
Second, although there is some support for a positive
relationship between corporate philanthropy and
corporate financial performance, because of the
existing studies’ lack of due consideration of causality
in this relationship (e.g., Hillman and Keim, 2001;
Waddock and Graves, 1997), we are unable to con-
clude that corporate philanthropy leads to greater
financial performance. Lastly, agency-related variables
such as managers’ shareholding, ownership structure,
board composition and managerial discretion have
been continually cited as the most robust factors that
predict corporate philanthropy (e.g., Atkinson and
Galaskiewicz, 1988; Bartkus et al., 2002; Boatsman
and Gupta, 1996; Helland and Smith, 2003; Johnson
and Greening, 1999; Wang and Coffey, 1992). If
managers engage in more corporate philanthropy
when they are able to act out of self-interest and
personal preferences, we should not observe that on
average corporate philanthropy is positively associated
with financial performance.3 However, the weight of
evidence seems to support a positive philanthropy-
performance relationship, inconsistent with the
agency theory argument.
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Figure 2. The performance-enhancing perspective of corporate philanthropy.
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Figure 1. The agency perspective of corporate philanthropy.
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Incorporating ideas from organization theory,
strategic management and social psychology, this
article provides alternative explanations for corporate
philanthropy and its relationship with corporate
financial performance, and attempts to resolve the
issues highlighted above. The main argument of the
article is drawn from the observation that managerial
values4 strongly influence organizational behavior
(Beach and Mitchell, 1978; Hambrick and Mason,
1984; Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004). Strategic
behavior and decision-making in organizational
settings can, therefore, be viewed as reflections of
the values of top managers. The managerial values
that are of particular interest in this context are
benevolence and integrity. Benevolence leads man-
agers to demonstrate intrinsic concern for others,
while integrity results in managerial behaviors that
are consistent with their values and/or based on
morally justifiable principles.
It will be argued in this article that, on the one
hand, top managers with benevolence and integrity
values are more likely to spread their intrinsic con-
cern for others into the wider society in the form of
corporate philanthropy. On the other hand, top
managers high in benevolence and integrity are
likely to contribute to trusting firm-stakeholder
relationships, thereby improving corporate financial
performance. The key argument made in this article,
therefore, is rather different from the conventional
argument that corporate philanthropy directly leads
to higher corporate financial performance. Instead, it
suggests that the relationship between corporate
philanthropy and corporate financial performance
found in the existing literature may be largely
spurious. An organization’s philanthropic activities
and financial performance may be correlated, but
this relationship is not necessarily a causal one: Both
corporate philanthropy and corporate financial per-
formance can be the results of managerial values
(Figure 3). In fact, this argument is in accord with
the role of integrity in strategic leadership suggested
by Worden (2003). According to Worden, tension
can occur when strategic planning is aimed at
enhanced financial performance while the firm’s
mission strives to contribute to the wider society.
Here, integrity can function as a mediator providing
for credible leadership that resolves this tension. In
this regard, this article expands Worden’s (2003)
argument on integrity to also include managerial
benevolence as such a mediator.
The article thus directly contributes to the extant
literature that examines the relationship between
corporate philanthropy and corporate social perfor-
mance: The role of managerial values should be
Managerial
credibility and 
stakeholder  
trust
Corporate
philanthropy 
Corporate
financial
performance
Managerial values: 
Benevolence
Integrity 
Organizational
culture 
Figure 3. A managerial value model of corporate philanthropy.
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explicitly taken into consideration in order to discover
the true philanthropy-performance relationship.
Further, this article also contributes to the literature
on the antecedents of corporate philanthropy, by
outlining a much richer argument for the role of
benevolence and integrity values in affecting corpo-
rate philanthropy and the mediating role of organi-
zational culture. Although some previous empirical
studies have established some association between
managerial values and corporate social activities
(e.g., Buchholtz et al., 1999; Lerner and Fryxell, 1994;
Thompson et al., 1993), their discussions were often
limited to very general terms and thus did not identify
the specific managerial values. Furthermore, few
studies have discussed the indirect link between
managerial values and corporate philanthropy
through organizational culture.
The main focus of the article, therefore, is to
argue for two main inter-related relationships. The
first is that between managerial values (i.e., benev-
olence and integrity) and corporate philanthropy:
Managers high in these values are more likely to
spread their concern for the welfare of others to
community settings in the form of corporate
philanthropy. The second relationship is that
between managerial values and corporate financial
performance: The same set of values also helps to
build trust among the firm’s primary stakeholders,
which in turn may contribute to the firm’s financial
performance. We now turn to the discussion of the
first relationship between managerial values and
corporate philanthropy.
Managerial values and corporate
philanthropy
Managerial values
Individual values are fundamental elements in
people’s belief systems. They consist of definable
goals that motivate and guide people’s preferences,
attitudes, and behaviors (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003;
Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992, 1994). Individuals
demonstrate considerable differences in personal
values and beliefs (Middlemist and Hitt, 1981;
Schwartz, 1992).5 Due to a need for consistency
between one’s values and actions (Rokeach, 1973)
and the reward one obtains from taking actions
consistent with one’s values, people often behave in
ways that express their important values or promote
the attainment of those values (Bardi and Schwartz,
2003). It then follows that managerial values, which
reflect the manager’s philosophical view of how
others inside and outside the corporation should be
treated, are fundamental to managerial decision-
making (Beach and Mitchell, 1978; Buchholtz
et al., 1999; Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004) and
strongly influence organizational outcomes (Hage
and Dewar, 1973). Similar argument also emerges
from the upper echelons perspective (Finkelstein and
Hambrick, 1990; Hambrick and Mason, 1984),
which suggests that managerial values and charac-
teristics combine with top managers’ eventual per-
ception of a situation to provide the basis for making
strategic choices.
Among multiple values of managers, of direct
relevance to corporate philanthropy are clusters of
managerial values that reflect benevolence and
integrity. According to Schwartz’s (1992) value
structures, benevolence encompasses all those spe-
cific values having as their core objective the pres-
ervation and enhancement of the welfare of others.
Therefore, top managers who value benevolence
show understanding of and appreciation for the
welfare of others and attempt to promote it. In this
sense, benevolence shares the common feature of
placing others’ welfare ahead of one’s own, in
common with some of the other-regarding values
that have been emphasized in previous studies, such
as altruism (Batson, 1991; Krebs, 1970), concern for
others (Korsgaard et al., 1996), and social interest
(Crandall, 1975). Another dimension of managerial
values relevant to this discussion is integrity. In this
article, we define integrity as encompassing two key
elements, both of which are essential for a complete
understanding of its meaning. The first element of
integrity refers to consistency between an individ-
ual’s values and behavior; and the second element
refers to the adherence to the moral principle of
fairness. The first element of integrity, i.e., consis-
tency between values and behaviors, has been argued
by various researchers (Badaracco and Ellsworth,
1989; Simons, 1999; Yukl and Van Fleet, 1992;
Worden, 2003). For example, Yukl and Van Fleet
have stated ‘‘integrity means that a person’s behavior
is consistent with espoused values’’ (1992, p. 151).
Similarly, Worden has defined integrity as ‘‘consistency
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between word and deed, in line with a consistent
set of principles or commitments, especially in
the context of a temptation or challenge to the
contrary’’ (2003, p. 33). Integrity, however, means
more than mere consistency.6 It also refers to
adherence to a set of principles. Although no
agreement has yet been reached regarding which
specific principles are required for integrity
(Worden, 2003), it is often argued that they must
be morally justifiable. For example, fairness and
honesty are often cited as necessary (Badaracco and
Ellsworth, 1989), although not sufficient (Becker,
1998), principles underlying integrity. In this article,
we combine these two aspects of integrity to posit
that managers who value integrity are considered
more likely to demonstrate both consistency
between their values and behavior and adherence to
fairness as its underlying moral principle. The
inclusion of fairness in the definition of integrity is
particularly relevant in the context of this article,
where interpersonal dynamics between managers
and other stakeholders (and society at large) is the
primary concern.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that that
although we focus on benevolence and integrity,
these values are only part of a top manager’s value
system, which is typically composed of multiple
values ranked in a hierarchy (Hambrick and
Brandon, 1988). Top managers may be confronted
by situations in which they cannot satisfy all their
values. For example, they may sometimes have to
choose between fulfilling their duty to an organi-
zation and devoting resources to the community.
When there are conflicts among multiple values,
they will submerge other values in favor of the
dominant values at the top of their value systems.
Thus managers can indulge their benevolence and
integrity values only when these values do not
conflict with other values or they are dominant in
their value systems.
Benevolence and integrity values as the antecedents
of corporate philanthropy
In this section, the contention that top managers’
benevolence and integrity affect a firm’s likelihood
of engaging in corporate philanthropic activities,
both directly and indirectly through top managers’
influence on organizational culture (see Figure 3),
will be explored in greater detail.
Corporate philanthropy is, by definition, gifts
given by corporations to social and charitable causes.
It is generally considered as a component of the
larger domain of corporate social responsibility.
Carroll (1979) identified four levels of corporate
social responsibility: economic, legal, ethical, and
discretionary. Since corporate philanthropy often
extends beyond areas that are directly associated with
a corporation’s business relationships, it fits within
the discretionary category of social responsibility,
which has been weighted the lowest in importance
among the four categories. Wood, for example, rates
corporate philanthropy as ‘‘last in, first out’’ (1991,
p. 698) on a firm’s action inventory. Thus philan-
thropic contributions are generally described as
purely voluntary (Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004;
Wood, 1991). Such a categorization of corporate
philanthropy suggests that top managers at the apex
of the corporate hierarchy are likely to be the key
players in setting policies and making decisions about
corporate philanthropy (Buchholtz et al., 1999).
Indeed, according to Salancik and Pfeffer (1977),
administrator (manager) impact is greatest for issues
not directly subject to the constraints established by
powerful interest groups. Similarly, Galaskiewicz has
stated that corporate philanthropic contributions
‘‘fall to the discretion of managers who can only use
their good judgment in deciding whether to give
and at what level’’ (1997, p. 445). The discretionary
nature of corporate philanthropy suggests that
philanthropic activities are largely under manage-
rial discretion (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990;
Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). Thus top man-
agers’ personal characteristics, such as the values that
they hold, are expected to play a significant role in
decisions on corporate philanthropy.
The evidence provided by some empirical studies,
albeit limited, seems to be supportive of the exis-
tence of a relationship between managerial values
and corporate philanthropy. For example, Lerner
and Fryxell (1994) found that corporations demon-
strate high levels of corporate philanthropy when top
managers are scored high in community orienta-
tion,7 which is a proxy for managerial values. Using
similar measures of managerial values, Thompson
et al. (1993) have reported that in small businesses,
owner values are the most important factor
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predicting levels of charitable donations. In addition,
a study by Buchholtz et al. (1999), which measured
managerial values by asking top managers to weight
the relative importance of six different organizational
goals, demonstrated that managerial values empha-
sizing service to the community is positively
associated with corporate philanthropy.
Benevolence, integrity, and corporate philanthropy
As we have seen, a key feature of benevolence
is a concern for others’ welfare, like similar other-
regarding values such as altruism (Batson, 1991;
Krebs, 1970). Since benevolent top managers are
more likely to show understanding of and appreci-
ation for the welfare of others, and to act to promote
it, their intrinsic concern for other people is likely to
be expressed in the form of corporate philanthropy
that enhances social well-being.
Consistent with the above argument, Campbell
et al. (1999) have demonstrated in a study of food
distributors and producers that top managers’ social
consciousness could reliably predict which firms
would or would not indulge in philanthropic
activities. In addition, Agle et al. (1999) examined
the levels of CEOs’ self-interest versus their ‘‘other-
regarding’’ interest, a construct similar to benevo-
lence, and reported that CEOs’ compassion for
others and willingness to work for the welfare of
others were associated with philanthropic service to
the community. Therefore, firms with top managers
who value benevolence would be expected to en-
gage in greater corporate philanthropy. As managers
vary greatly in their values (Hambrick and Brandon,
1988; Hambrick and Mason, 1984), substantial var-
iation in corporate philanthropy as a function of such
variability is to be expected.
Proposition 1a: Managerial benevolence has a positive
effect on a firm’s likelihood of
engaging in corporate philanthropic
activities.
In addition to benevolence, integrity is also expected
to affect corporate philanthropy. Based on our def-
inition of integrity as encompassing both consistency
between values and behavior and adherence to
fairness as a fundamental moral value, we argue that
integrity affects corporate philanthropy in two
interrelated ways. First, integrity is expected to
moderate the relationship between managerial
benevolence and corporate philanthropy highlighted
in Proposition 1a. Since one important aspect of
integrity is the consistency between words and
deeds, or between an individual’s values and
behaviors (Simons, 1999; Yukl and Van Fleet,
1992), top managers with integrity should be more
likely to engage in behaviors that are consistent with
the values that they hold. This suggests that benev-
olent top managers with integrity will be more likely
to behave according to their value of benevolence in
organizational decision-making. Integrity thus
ensures that behavior based on the value of
benevolence will be delivered to stakeholders with
consistency, regardless of the existence of direct
business relationships with the stakeholders. There-
fore, when a benevolent top manager also values
integrity, the effect of managerial benevolence on
corporate philanthropy will be stronger than when
the top manager only values benevolence but is lack
of integrity.
Proposition 1b: Managerial integrity positively mod-
erates the effect of benevolence on a
firm’s likelihood of engaging in
corporate philanthropic activities.
In addition to the moderating effect of integrity on the
relationship between benevolence and corporate
philanthropy, managerial value of integrity may have
some direct impact on corporate philanthropic activ-
ities as well. Another important aspect of integrity is
the adherence to principles deemed morally accept-
able8 (McFall, 1987). For example, some authors argue
that integrity involves ‘‘adherence to moral and ethical
principles’’ (Simons, 1999, p. 90) or includes ‘‘moral
obligation’’ (Husted, 1998). Becker (1998) has also
stated that the principles in integrity require moral
justification.
While there is no overall agreement on the specific
principles that underlie integrity (Worden, 2003), it
may be possible to identify the particular moral
principles that are relevant to corporate philanthropy.
Several researchers (e.g., Bews and Rossouw, 2002;
Mayer et al., 1995) have suggested that fairness
should be considered one of the moral principles
underlying integrity. Fairness refers to equal moral
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consideration of the interests of others (Bews and
Rossouw, 2002, p. 382), as seen in the common
metaphor of a ‘‘level playing field.’’ Mayer et al.
(1995) have pointed out that the belief that a person
has a strong sense of fairness affects the degree to
which the person is judged to have integrity. McFall
(1987) also states that a key requirement for moral
integrity is impartiality, a construct close to fairness.
In the moral connection between a business and its
many social constituencies, corporate philanthropy
can be understood as a mechanism for managers to
promote fairness in society by alleviating its burdens.
For example, firms may endeavor to level the playing
field by equalizing opportunities for education for a
disadvantaged group (Schwartz and Post, 2002).
Similarly, programs supporting childcare, cultural
events, minority education, and sports activities help
people in local communities enjoy similar quality of
life. A concern for fairness has also prompted many
U.S. companies to give a big donation to victims of
9/11 or of natural disasters, victims who are generally
considered to have been unfairly damaged.
A concern for fairness, one of the moral principles
underlying integrity, is thus likely to result in greater
corporate philanthropy. It then follows that a man-
ager who values integrity will also value fairness as a
moral principle and will be more likely to engage in
corporate philanthropy. Therefore,
Proposition 1c: Managerial integrity has a direct
positive effect on the likelihood of
engaging in corporate philanthropic
activities.
Organizational culture as a mediator
The discussion so far has focused on the direct effect
of the values held by a firm’s top managers on the
firm’s likelihood of engaging in corporate philan-
thropy. However, the direct effect of managerial
values may be limited, to the extent that top
managers are not always in direct charge of decision-
making regarding corporate philanthropic activities.
For example, many large firms have set up inde-
pendent corporate foundations to institutionalize
philanthropic programs, which to some extent re-
duce the direct influence of top managers in making
decisions about corporate philanthropic activities
(Werbel and Carter, 2002). Moreover, in some
firms, authority to make these decisions is delegated
to specialized divisional managers (Saiia et al., 2003;
Waddock and Boyle, 1995). When other specialized
managers plan, execute, and monitor philanthropic
programs, the influence of top managers would be
expected to dwindle. Therefore, the argument that
top managers’ values will directly determine
corporate philanthropic activities may be an over-
simplification.
Still, top managers can, at least in part, have an
impact indirectly via their influence on organiza-
tional culture. Organizational culture describes the
social interactions among members of an organiza-
tion (Rousseau, 1990). It shapes members’ behav-
ioral patterns and creates an environment in which
certain behaviors are encouraged and receive support
(Trice and Beyer, 1993). Although top managers are
affected by already established organizational values
and culture, they are also often considered the
architect of their organization’s culture (Day and
Lord, 1988; Schein, 2004). Their influence on
organizational culture can even go beyond their
career span in firms (Zucker, 1986).
Top managers can, in various ways, affect the
formation of a corporate culture and thereby pro-
mote patterns of behavior that are consistent with
their personal values throughout the entire orga-
nization. They indoctrinate and socialize employees
to their ways of thinking through, for example,
speeches, stories, rituals, and mission statements.
They also mold organizational culture through
daily management practices, strategic decision-
making, and other exemplary behaviors that reflect
their personal values. They also interpret social
reality faced by organizational members in such a
way that particular values are emphasized (Smircich
and Morgan, 1982). Over time, organizational
members may thus develop mental schema that are
consistent with the managers’ values, ideologies,
and strategies.
Top managers’ personal integrity may also shape
organizations’ moral culture through its role in
facilitating the development of integrity capacity at
the firm level. According to Petrick and Quinn
(2000, 2001), integrity capacity is the individual
and/or collective capability for repeated process
alignment of moral awareness, deliberation,
character and conduct that demonstrates balanced
judgment, enhances sustained moral develop-
ment and promotes supportive systems for moral
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decision-making. Integrity capacity encompasses
four dimensions of firm capability: process, judg-
ment, development, and system. These dimensions
of integrity capacity represent the firm’s capacity to
be aware of moral issues and to prepare to act, to
make balanced judgments on those issues, to foster
an ethical work culture in the firm, and to institu-
tionalize organizational policies and systems to
handle moral complexity. Therefore, to the extent
that the integrity of top managers influences a firm’s
capacity to foster an ethical work climate and to
institutionalize relevant policies for ethical issues, it
reinforces an organizational culture that emphasizes
integrity (Petrick and Quinn, 2000, 2001).
Top managers’ values can also shape organiza-
tional culture through attraction-selection-attrition
cycles (Schneider, 1987). As managerial values
become integrated into the normal channels of
organizational decision-making, such as the devel-
opment of missions and strategic goals, the allocation
of resources, and the promotion of key employees,
those values will have an impact on the type of
people who are attracted to, are selected by, and
stay with the organization. Over time, people who
belong to the same organization become more alike
because organizations tend to attract and retain those
individuals who appreciate top managers’ values and
organizational culture, while those who do not fit
the culture leave (Schneider, 1987).
Taken together, though many other factors
can affect the formation of organizational culture
(Martin et al., 1985), top managers play a very
crucial role in influencing culture as they pass down
their own values to other organization members
through their direct influence or through the
development of organizational integrity capacity. In
addition, top managers may also influence culture
through the process of attracting and retaining those
who appreciate their values (Schein, 2004). It then
follows that a firm with a top manager who values
benevolence and integrity is likely to have an
organizational culture that promotes such values. As
a result, benevolence and integrity values provide a
behavioral norm that organizational members follow
when they interact both among themselves and with
outside stakeholders. For instance, to the extent that
those directly in charge of corporate philanthropic
activities internalize the values of the top managers,
top managers’ benevolence and integrity values will
indirectly affect a firm’s likelihood of engaging in
corporate philanthropic activities. So, even when
independent corporate foundations are not directly
controlled by top managers, the activities of such
charitable foundations may reflect an organizational
culture as established on the basis of top managers’
values. Therefore,
Proposition 2: Managerial benevolence and integrity
have an indirect effect on a firm’s
likelihood of engaging in corporate
philanthropic activities through the
top managers’ impact on organiza-
tional culture.
Managerial values and corporate financial
performance
Having discussed the relationship between manage-
rial values of benevolence and integrity and corpo-
rate philanthropy, we move onto examine the effect
of the same set of managerial values on corporate
financial performance. In particular, we argue that
managerial benevolence and integrity should en-
hance top managers’ credibility and help to generate
trust among stakeholders, both directly and indi-
rectly through top managers’ influence on organi-
zational culture. High levels of credibility and trust
will, in turn, augment corporate financial perfor-
mance (see Figure 3).
Benevolence is likely to influence trust forma-
tion through an attribution process. Stakeholders
draw inferences about top managers’ intentions and
motives by looking behind their words and
behaviors (Deutsch, 1973; Doney et al., 1998). If
stakeholders perceive top managers to behave pre-
dominantly according to self-interested motives,
they are unlikely to trust the managers. In contrast,
if an attribution of benevolent intentions is made
by the stakeholders, a trusting relationship will
develop (Lindskold and Bennett, 1973). To the
extent that top managers’ benevolent values lead
them to demonstrate genuine interest in the welfare
of stakeholders and society and to the extent that
the interpretation of such benevolent intentions by
the stakeholders is facilitated, for example, through
sufficient interactions between the two parties,
stakeholders will experience affective attachments
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to top managers (Williams, 2001). As a result, trust
emerges in the relationship between top managers
with benevolent values and the firm’s stakeholders.
On the other hand, integrity may affect the
development of managerial credibility and trust
between a firm and its stakeholders through a
prediction process (Doney et al., 1998). When
managers demonstrate integrity, i.e., when the
managers’ future behavior is predictable based on
their past actions and words, the credibility of the
managers is established (Simons, 1999, 2002;
Worden, 2005). Managerial credibility is in turn
necessary for the development of stakeholder
commitment and trust between the two groups
(Good, 1988; Whitener et al., 1998).
In addition to their direct effects on firm-stake-
holders trust formation, managerial values of
benevolence and integrity may also influence cred-
ibility and trust indirectly through organizational
culture as a mediator. To the extent that organiza-
tional culture reflects and supports top managers’
values, employees will be influenced and guided by
those values in their interactions with stakeholders.
Furthermore, as we have argued earlier, the personal
integrity of top managers facilitates the development
of integrity capacity at the firm level, which in turn
reinforces an organizational culture that emphasizes
integrity. In particular, a firm’s capacity to foster an
ethical work climate and to institutionalize policies
to handle ethical issues allows stakeholders to attri-
bute a moral character to the firm at the system level
(Petrick and Quinn, 2000, 2001). Thus, while some
stakeholders, such as suppliers and customers, may
not have direct contact with the top managers
themselves, they can be indirectly affected by the top
managers’ values when they interact with employees
who have internalized the same values. So to the
extent that top managers’ benevolence and integrity
values are institutionalized and become embedded in
an organization’s culture over time, the organization
is likely to be perceived by stakeholders as a
trustworthy entity. Hence organizational culture
promoted by top managers’ values may have a
long-term and persistent effect on credibility and
trust formation.
High level of managerial credibility and trust
between a firm and its stakeholders, either as a direct
result of managerial values of benevolence and
integrity, or as an indirect result of these values
through organizational culture, often has financial
consequences for the firm. First, managerial credi-
bility and trust facilitate information and knowledge
sharing between the firm and its stakeholders, which
improves the firm’s problem-solving abilities,
providing important foundations for organizational
learning (Huff and Kelley, 2003; McEvily et al.,
2003). Second, trust mitigates stakeholders’ con-
cerns about holdup by the firm, especially when
stakeholders are required to invest in valuable firm-
specific assets. Thus, when there is sufficient trust,
the stakeholders will have stronger incentives to
make valuable firm-specific investments that
promote new revenue generation and competitive
advantage (Das and Teng, 1998; Shleifer and
Summers, 1988). Credibility and trust can also
reduce transaction costs (Barney and Hansen, 1994;
Whitener et al., 1998) and expand a firm’s ex-
change opportunities (Carson et al., 2003; Ring
and Van de Ven, 1994; Zajac and Olsen, 1993).
Economic exchange relationships are often replete
with various risks of opportunism (Barney and
Hansen, 1994; Whitener et al., 1998; Williamson,
1975). Although some monitoring and bonding
mechanisms may be used to manage these risks and
thus reduce transaction costs, high levels of credi-
bility and trust is often a more effective alternative
that reduces the need for complex contracts and
further enables the firm to exploit otherwise fore-
gone exchange opportunities (Hagen and Choe,
1998; Hosmer, 1995).
The above arguments suggest the following:
Proposition 3: Managerial benevolence and integrity
enhance corporate financial perfor-
mance through promoting managerial
credibility and high levels of trust
among firm stakeholders.
Implications of the managerial values
approach to corporate philanthropy
To recapitulate, top managers’ benevolence and
integrity values lead to corporate philanthropy; these
same managerial values also facilitate the develop-
ment of managerial credibility and trust with stake-
holders, which, in turn, increase corporate financial
performance. This suggests that the relationship
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between corporate philanthropy and corporate
financial performance that has been found in previ-
ous research could be a spurious one, since both
corporate philanthropy and corporate financial
performance are derived from the same set of
managerial values. To further understand the insights
provided by the managerial values model of corpo-
rate philanthropy, it is helpful to discuss some of the
implications the model, especially in relating the two
other existing perspectives of corporate philan-
thropy: the agency perspective and performance-
enhancing perspective.
First, although the managerial values model sug-
gests that top managers engage in philanthropic
activities because of their benevolent values and
moral obligations without deriving any personal
financial benefits, corporate philanthropy based on
this motive can still be considered an agency cost to
shareholders since it ‘‘indulges the manager’s utility
for ‘doing good’ while shareholders incur opportu-
nity loss’’ (Helland and Smith, 2003, p. 2). In this
sense, the argument developed here appears to be
aligned with the basic argument of agency theory,
which states that corporate philanthropy is the result
of top managers’ desires to fulfill their own needs or
values at the expense of shareholders (e.g., Friedman,
1970; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Werbel and
Carter, 2002). Despite this apparent consistency, the
argument presented here makes an important
departure from the agency argument. A key differ-
ence is that the managerial values model identifies an
additional relationship that links managerial values
with corporate financial performance. The addition
of such a link has important implications for
understanding corporate philanthropy. According to
the agency perspective, because corporate philan-
thropy is inconsistent with shareholder wealth
maximization, top managers who engage in such
activities should be constrained by various corporate
governance mechanisms. The managerial values
approach, however, suggests just the opposite. It
implies instead that constraints imposed on managers
who value benevolence and integrity may be costly,
because these constraints will also reduce the
potential financial benefit that these managers can
bring to the firm and its shareholders. As a result,
shareholders may find it to their own benefit to give
more discretion to such managers, even if doing so
encourages more corporate philanthropy. This
implication drawn from the managerial values model
agrees to some extent with the thinking of Werbel
and Carter, who argued that ‘‘even if charitable
donations are not supportive of the company’s
mission, cost control constraints that intrude on
CEO decision latitude may have more negative
financial consequences than positive financial
consequences’’ (2002, p. 57).
Thus, even though as the agency perspective
argues, corporate philanthropy itself may reduce a
firm’s wealth by diverting valuable resources, the
managerial benevolence and integrity values that lead
to corporate philanthropy may also have counter-
vailing positive effects on the firm’s financial perfor-
mance, because these values help the firm build
credibility and trusting relationships with its stake-
holders. When the increase in corporate financial
performance more than offsets the cost of corporate
philanthropy, the firm’s shareholders will benefit
from top managers’ benevolence and integrity, and
thus they may not put significant constraints on man-
agers with these values. In this sense, managerial
benevolence and integrity can be considered as mech-
anisms intervening between corporate philanthropy and
corporate financial objectives, making the seemingly
contradictory goals complementary (Worden, 2003).
Second, as having been illustrated earlier, the main
difference between the managerial values argument
and the performance-enhancing argument for
corporate philanthropy is that the former suggests that
the corporate philanthropy and financial performance
are both the result of managerial values of benevo-
lence and integrity, while the latter suggests that firms
engage in corporate philanthropic activities because
they lead to better corporate financial performance.
Although the two perspectives provide different
explanations for the positive relationship between
corporate philanthropy and corporate financial
performance, they do not have to be mutually
exclusive: a manager who values benevolence and
integrity may engage in corporate philanthropic
activities that also induce positive stakeholder support
and thereby improve the firm’s financial perfor-
mance. Therefore, although the managerial values
approach to corporate philanthropy suggests that the
relationship between corporate philanthropy and
corporate financial performance may be correlated
but not causal, this approach does not entirely exclude
the possibility that a direct relationship between
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corporate philanthropy and corporate financial
performance still exists.
However, it is our conjecture that the argument
based on the managerial values model should be able
to demonstrate greater validity in explaining the link
between corporate philanthropy and corporate
financial performance than the argument that cor-
porate philanthropy enhances corporate financial
performance. The latter perspective emphasizes the
instrumental use of corporate philanthropy. But as
stakeholders scrutinize the organization for cues as to
its morality (Godfrey, 2005; Trevino and Young-
blood, 1990), the instrumental use of ethics and
other-regarding values by the organization may
cause mistrust from these stakeholders. Moreover, if
such tactics are perceived as insincere by stakehold-
ers, they may even be counterproductive (Green-
berg, 1990). Thus, to the extent that such an
instrumental use of corporate philanthropy is antic-
ipated by stakeholders, its role in inducing positive
stakeholder support will be discounted, and the
validity of the argument will be challenged.
On the other hand, the managerial values model
of corporate philanthropy, which argues that cor-
porate philanthropy and stakeholder trust result
from managers’ benevolence and integrity, is less
subject to such concerns. Intrinsic benevolence and
integrity are hard to fake (Depaulo et al., 1980;
Frank, 1988), so firms without such managers will
not be able to reveal such values in order to build
stakeholder trust. Similarly, Barney and Hansen
(1994) have argued that mimicking others’ values to
achieve high levels of trustworthiness is not easy,
and even if some trustworthiness is achieved, it is
difficult to sustain. Further support for this argu-
ment can be found in the resource-based view of
the firm. Managerial attributes, such as values,
principles, and standards, which make high levels
of trustworthiness possible, reflect top managers’
unique paths through history (i.e., path depen-
dence) and are socially complex. This makes these
types of individual attributes immune from imita-
tion and rapid diffusion (Barney, 1991; Barney and
Hansen, 1994; Dierickx and Cool, 1989). There-
fore, the process underlying the managerial values
model whereby intrinsic managerial values lead to
stakeholder trust may be more robust than that
underlying the argument that corporate philan-
thropy improves corporate financial performance.
Conclusions
The article provides alternative explanations for cor-
porate philanthropy and its relationship with corpo-
rate financial performance. It argues that corporate
philanthropy can be the direct result of top managers’
benevolence and integrity values, and that these same
values also bring other benefits to the firm: they
facilitate building trusting relationships with stake-
holders, and thus improve corporate financial per-
formance. These arguments provide additional
insights into some findings of previous empirical re-
search in this area. Many studies have examined the
relationship between corporate social responsibility
and corporate financial performance. The over-
whelming evidence suggests that there is a positive
relationship between them (Griffin and Mahon,
1997; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Roman et al.,
1999), which is often interpreted as evidence that
corporate philanthropy leads to high levels of financial
performance. However, there is a lack of theory to
clarify how these two should be related (Wood and
Jones, 1995). The managerial values model developed
here illustrates clear theoretical links among mana-
gerial values, corporate philanthropy, and corporate
financial performance, and argues that without
appropriate control for managerial values, a positive
correlation between corporate philanthropy and
corporate financial performance may suggest a spu-
rious relationship between the two but does not imply
causality.
However, the validity of the managerial values
model of corporate philanthropy and the implied
spurious relationship between corporate philanthropy
and corporate financial performance are ultimately
empirical issues. There are clearly challenges involved
in conducting empirical tests of the model and its
implications, given the complicated chains of causality
and the difficulty in obtaining measures of some key
variables such as managerial values and stakeholder
trust. To overcome these potential difficulties, future
research would benefit from using fine-grained and
carefully designed primary data to measure the key
variables. For example, while managerial values are
perhaps the most difficult to measure directly (Ham-
brick and Mason, 1984), some background charac-
teristics of top managers, such as socioeconomic
background and religious beliefs (Weaver and Agle,
2002), may serve as possible proxies. Or, it may be
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possible to indirectly measure top managers’ values by
examining their communications, such as speeches
delivered to stakeholders (Sussman et al., 1983).
Moreover, since we argue for causal effects of mana-
gerial values on corporate philanthropy and corporate
financial performance, future empirical studies that are
able to clearly demonstrate causality, for example,
through collecting longitudinal data and designing
appropriate methods that effectively control for alter-
native explanations, would be most desirable.
We hope that the arguments developed in this
article have emphasized the need for researchers
to take a more comprehensive perspective in
examining both the motives for corporate philan-
thropy and its relationship with financial perfor-
mance. When this has been done, the results should
be able to provide scholars and managers with a
fuller picture of corporate social behavior.
Notes
1 Although the results of these studies are informative,
their implications should be interpreted with caution.
This is because corporate social performance generally
has a broader meaning than corporate philanthropy.
Among the four levels of corporate social responsibility
identified by Carroll (1979), i.e., economic, legal, ethi-
cal, and discretionary, corporate philanthropy belongs to
the discretionary category.
2 An exception is a recent study by Godfrey (2005),
who outlined a more complex theoretical explanation
for why corporate philanthropy may enhance share-
holder wealth.
3 Of course, it is still possible that corporate philan-
thropy could sometimes simultaneously cater to a
manager’s taste for charity and has a positive effect on
financial performance.
4 In this article, we use the term ‘‘managerial values’’ to
refer to ‘‘values’’ held by managers and thus applied to
managerial settings. ‘‘Value’’ as a general concept, how-
ever, can be held by any individual and thus applied to
much broader contexts than purely ‘‘managerial’’ settings.
5 For example, based on the universal requirements of
human existence, Schwartz (1992) clusters values into ten
distinct types that serve different motivational purposes:
power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direc-
tion, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity,
and security. Further, those 10 values are grouped into
four higher order values: openness to change vs. conser-
vation, and self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement.
6 Indeed, if integrity means simply having one’s
behavior consistent with one’s values, then Hitler had
integrity. We thank an anonymous reviewer for helping
us clarify this point.
7 Specifically, Lerner and Fryxell (1994) developed a
survey instrument to measure CEO community orienta-
tion as one of six CEO orientations toward ‘‘generic’’
stakeholder groups. For the community group, four
types of corporate activities were identified: financially
supporting charitable and philanthropic activities, sup-
porting arts and cultural activities, financially supporting
colleges and universities, and responding to requests for
support from social service agencies.
8 McFall (1987) terms it ‘‘moral integrity.’’
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